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Did You Know Libya Resembles America? (The Endgame)

  Did You Know Libya Resembles America? (The Endgame)

Did You Know Libya Resembles America? (The Endgame)

 

The political and security landscape in Libya reflects profound complexity, shaped by internal conflicts and overlapping foreign interests. Since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, the Libyan crisis has been governed by a web of temporary alliances and deep divisions that have fostered chaos and political paralysis. This situation can be understood through three main dimensions.

Much like the United States, Libya has its own version of a “deep state” but with a different character. This Libyan deep state is composed of alliances among militia leaders, tribal elders, and business figures who have capitalized on the chaos for political and economic gain. The inability of formal institutions like the Government of National Unity or the House of Representatives to assert full control stems from the penetration of these informal actors into the state’s core. These alliances are reminiscent of American lobbying networks, but in Libya, they are more fragmented and far less centralized, making the situation more about competing individual interests than coordinated governance.

The Libyan military is divided between the country’s east and west. In the west, militias aligned with the Government of National Unity operate independently and often pursue conflicting interests. In the east, forces led by General Khalifa Haftar struggle to exert control over the entire national territory.

On the political front, Libya’s leadership mirrors the U.S. presidency when it is gridlocked by institutional checks and balances. Figures like Aguila Saleh or Mohamed Al-Menfi hold official titles as heads of the House of Representatives and Presidential Council, respectively, but lack the effective authority to issue binding orders or unify the military. This disconnect between theoretical authority and practical power resembles the U.S. president’s occasional inability to fully control the military despite constitutional powers.

One of the clearest indicators of Libya’s ongoing crisis is the political paralysis that plagues its institutions. The enduring deadlock between the House of Representatives in Tobruk and the High Council of State in Tripoli reflects repeated failures to pass laws or reach comprehensive agreements. The practice of “trading favors” in American politics where lawmakers link support for one bill to the passage of another is practiced in Libya in a more primitive form, where issues such as oil, government appointments, or even the state budget become bargaining chips in political standoffs. Rather than resolving these conflicts through national dialogue, they devolve into side battles that obstruct progress mirroring legislative gridlock in the U.S. Congress due to partisan disputes.

Armed groups in Libya can also be metaphorically compared to local militias in the United States. These Libyan factions wield medium to heavy weaponry, but often rely on unstable sources of funding like fuel smuggling or foreign support. Just as powerful economic lobbies back certain militias in the U.S., many Libyan militias receive direct backing from foreign powers such as Turkey or Russia, which enhances their influence. As in the U.S., where local militias are no match for those supported by major lobbies, Libya’s lesser-backed militias cannot compete with internationally supported forces, skewing the balance of power.

Libya further resembles the U.S. in scenarios where political division leads to complete governmental dysfunction. The key difference, however, is that Libya lacks the robust institutions that allow the United States to weather such crises. Internal fragmentation and the absence of unified leadership in Libya have prolonged the crisis, with the country now governed through unsustainable and ad hoc mechanisms.

 

The longer political settlements are delayed in Libya, the greater the likelihood the country could fragment into semi-autonomous regions. This risk mirrors what could happen in the U.S. if its internal tensions spun out of control. Libya’s current condition offers a real-world example of what a state in disintegration might look like where personal and factional interests overwhelm national institutions in the absence of cohesive leadership. While the United States benefits from deeply rooted institutions capable of absorbing shocks, Libya lacks such resilience, making it far more vulnerable to collapse if the status quo persists.