Why did Adbaiba mobilize an army to repel Adel Da’ab? (Gheryan the signal)
Less than a month ago, a conflict broke out inside the city of Benghazi, as a result of the attempt of Al Mahdi Albarghathi, the former Minister of Defense in the Government of National Accord, to gather his supporters and destabilize security within the city. This is how Arrjama leadership in Benghazi described what happened in the city, and fingers were pointed at Adbaiba government for being behind this military action, especially since the latter condemned the military clash that took place in Benghazi, held the leadership of Arrjama responsible for the security and stability of the city, and demanded the restoration of communications that had been cut off for citizens in the entire eastern region, which made many people believe that what happened in Gheryan was just a reaction to what happened in Benghazi, especially since Adel Da’ab, who joined Arrjma forces when they led their attack on Tripoli in April 2019, was able to control the city in just three hours.
But the question here is: was what happened in Gheryan just a reaction to what happened in Benghazi? If so, is it worth it for Adbaiba to mobilize an army to reclaim Gheryan from an armed group of only twenty military vehicles?
But before that, let's get acquainted with Gheryan from distance zero…
Gheryan 's strategic importance lies in its proximity to the capital Tripoli and is located in northwestern Libya. Its elevated location on the Nafusa Mountains provides a point of observation and control over the main transport routes, and control of Gheryan allows leverage on the main roads linking Tripoli to other parts of the country, including the southern region and the Tunisian border, and this strategic advantage makes Gheryan a valuable asset for any faction seeking to expand its control west of the country.
The geographical location of the city of Gheryan also plays a decisive role in its importance as it overlooks plains and valleys; this high terrain provides a natural defensive advantage, making it difficult for opposition forces to seize or control the city, and in general, Gheryan's strategic location, historical importance and geographical advantages make it an influential city in Libya the control of which can affect the balance of power in the region and have implications for trade, security and political dynamics within the country.
At the same time, the security balance in the city of Gheryan after the recent Tripoli war is relatively unstable, as the Gheryan Brigade, located in the Sahban camp in the Abu Rashada area, which is considered below Gharyan, was able to control the city, and the Stability Support Agency participated in this, which was able to open a branch in the city. All the information received from the residents of Gheryan indicates that the two forces controlled all the joints of the state inside the city, including the municipal council, and did not present a security model that created popular support for them.
At the same time, groups of supporters of Adel Da’ab, who left the city with Arrajma forces after their defeat in Tripoli, began to return to the city gradually over nearly two years, which made Da’ab call supporters inside the city, which in turn facilitated the process of controlling the city within a few hours with minimal human casualties.
Also, Daab's decision to return to the city and control it again would not have passed without approval and may have been with the blessing of the Fourth Brigade led by Osama Ajweli, as Ajweli’s force extends its control over a vast area starting from the Al-Hera area in Batin Aljabal Municipality to the Libyan-Tunisian border near Nalut, which makes it impossible for a military force to be able to easily enter Gheryan without Osama Ajweli’s blessing.
Ajweli knows Gheryan well, as he was the commander of the battle to reclaim Gheryan from General Haftar’s forces in the Tripoli War, the overthrow of Arrjma Force operations room, and its withdrawal with its supporters from Gheryan, which constituted a turning point in the course of the battle after that. Ajweli is also in a rift with Adbaiba government, and many sources have reported on the state of rapprochement that occurred between him and General Haftar, and information was received about a visit that had been arranged between the two men, so it is very likely that Ajweli is part of Da’abs acrobatics.
It seems that this is what made Dabaiba form an army to retake Gheryan, as the message was not for Daab, but for those who allowed Daab to pass, and at the same time an opportunity to extend control over the entire mountain to Mizdah, which is the last point of contact with Arrjma forces stationed in Shwerif. This is confirmed by facts, as the forces of the operations room formed by Resolution No. (445) arrived under the leadership of lieutenant colonel? Abdusalam Azubi; the resolution included all the military and non-military formations present in Tripoli and abroad, or rather all the formations that Dabaiba can use, which came out with military equipment, a number of personnel, and drone movement, giving the impression that it will meet an army, not Da’ab with 40 fighters, and some simple military vehicles.
With this scene, Adbaiba wanted to show everyone that he was ready for war if necessary. He also tried to show his achievement in unifying all those formations that had only united against General Haftar in the Tripoli war under his decision and command. He also demonstrated to all the forces opposing him his ability to manage the differences that existed and still exist between all these formations, an opportunity also to immunize himself from the danger of Juwaili, and to introduce a force for him to protect his government in Tripoli and immunize it from any aggression that may occur in the future.
Hence, Da’ab is the first door to the end of the dream of elections!!