Who inherits the Master of the army? (Clashes of the intractable Benghazi)
"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” Benjamin Franklin
The city of Benghazi, Libya's second largest and most densely populated city and the capital of eastern Libya, has been witnessing for several days a complete outage of communications and the Internet without a convincing reason by the responsible authorities, and no statement was made by the Benghazi-based government mandated by the House of Representatives in eastern Libya.
Libyan Post Telecommunications & Information Technology Company stated that the reason was a cut in the fiber optic cable in several routes, without mentioning whether this cut was accidental or perpetrated. Many accuse random excavations of cutting communications cables, but is all of Benghazi fed by a single cable so that if it is cut it will be completely cut off from the world? Does this one cable take that long (more than three days as of writing this article) to be repaired?
The truth that everyone knows and no one wants to mention – and is supported by the deafening silence of the government of the House of Representatives – is that the military forces controlling eastern Libya – Haftar's forces – have cut off communications since Friday night to carry out a military operation against what it called an infiltrating military cell!
Who is this infiltrating military cell and how did it reach the Salmani neighborhood in Benghazi? how large and how well equipped, such that the army needed to engage in armed clashes with them for several days before declaring control over them and the region? Why does the army need to cut off communications in order to wage war against an infiltrating cell? What is there to fear if it comes out publicly and leaks to the media?
This alleged cell is in fact a group of military escorts of Colonel Mahdi Albargathi, the former leader of “Operation Alkarama” and the former Minister of Defense in the Government of National Accord.
But how did Albargathi and his armed group reach Benghazi, and if he was wanted, how could he move and cover the entire distance from Tripoli to Benghazi without being stopped by any of the (army) units that control the area extending from Sirte in the east to the border with Egypt? How could an armed group capable of engaging in armed clashes for two days, sneak from Tripoli to Benghazi without being detected?
Before attempting to answer these questions, we first ask: Who is Al Mahdi Albarghathi? How did he leave, and subsequently, return to Benghazi?
A Mahdi Albargathi i is a former soldier with the rank of colonel. He played a role in the events of the revolution of February 17th, 2011, after which he took command of an important battalion in Benghazi before announcing in 2014 that he joined the military operation launched by Haftar in Benghazi, “Operation Alkarama.”
In 2016, Barghathi accepted his nomination as Minister of Defense in the Government of National Accord at the time and announced in a statement that he was heading to Tripoli to assume office, only to be subjected a few days later to an assassination attempt that targeted him with a car bomb while leaving the headquarters of his battalion in Benghazi, and after Barghathi accepted the position and moved to Tripoli to assume the Ministry of Defense, Haftar's leadership accused him of responsibility for many incidents and events, including an armed attack on Brak Ashati base in 2017, which killed 145 military personnel. Despite ISIS claiming responsibility for the attack, and despite Barghathi's continued denials of any involvement in the attack on Haftar's forces at Brak Ashati base, in 2018 Prime Minister Fayez Assaraj dismissed Barghathi.
At that time, many considered the decision to dismiss Barghathi as an attempt by Assaraj to rapprochement with Haftar, who accuses Albargathi of attacking his forces in the south, meaning that Assaraj expelled Albargathi because he attacked Haftar, who mobilized his forces and attacked Assaraj in Tripoli one year later!
Following his dismissal and the fading of his star, Albargathi remained in Tripoli for five years without any significant role in the events except for his participation – and the military force accompanying him – in repelling the aggression on Tripoli in 2019.
Suddenly and without warning, Albargathi returned to Benghazi, on Friday evening, after extensive consultations and communications from tribal figures in eastern Libya with Haftar’s leadership, which promised not to harm him and that he was no longer wanted by them, but they summoned him to appear before one of its security services upon his arrival to his home in Asalmani neighborhood.
This narrative is adopted by those loyal to Albargathi, while Haftar’s forces that clashed with them say that an infiltrating cell was able to enter and position itself in the Asalmani neighborhood to carry out operations to destabilize security and stability, which forced them to launch a military operation against them after they refused to surrender.
Due to the interruption of communications and the Internet, information is scarce about what is happening on the ground in Benghazi, and everything that is circulated by supporters of any party in the clashes cannot be trusted or considered except within the framework of propaganda for that party. But what is certain is that Haftar’s forces will be victorious in this battle and will eliminate their opponent and force him to flee or arrest him and perhaps kill him, but this will not answer the questions that we mentioned at the beginning of our article:
Why are communications cut off the whole of Benghazi? why do people accept that? Why do they sacrifice their inherent rights?
In Palestine, the Jews are fighting an existential battle with the people of Gaza and have not cut communications off Gaza, so why do our compatriots cut off our communication with the world to carry out a military operation that is supposed to be simple? It is assumed – according to their narrative – that it is for our benefit and for our protection.
There is no explanation for this except that the ruling tyrant in eastern Libya feels that he has reached the strength that qualifies him to do more than that, and he will only receive people’s praise for his wisdom, courage, and strength in defending them against this sabotage cell that targets their security and stability. Perhaps they’re thinking: Let us sacrifice a few of our rights and freedoms in order to live in security. Those who practice oppression today against their opponents will not oppress us, for we follow the proverb that says (Save my head and cut others), (duck and it will miss you), and (No harm comes to he who does nothing).
We come to the questions surrounding the strange and sudden return of Al Mahdi Albargathi to Benghazi after six years he spent in Tripoli opposing and antagonistic to Haftar.
Sources close to Al Mahdi Albargathi and his loyalists – some of whom died in the clashes – say that Albargathi returned to Benghazi after high-level coordination with the leadership of Haftar's forces and promises to give him safety and not to harm him or any of his companions, while sources close to Haftar's forces who attacked and clashed with him (Tariq bin Ziyad Battalion) say that the latter infiltrated Benghazi surreptitiously and managed to enter with his armed cell into Asalmani with the intention of destabilizing security; and that they tried initially to summon him to appear before a routine interrogation to answer only security questions and reservations; it was his refusal to comply with the investigation that led to the clashes.
With complete impartiality, I cannot accept the narrative presented by Tariq bin Ziyad Battalion for several reasons; the first of which is the impossibility for Albargathi to return on his own to lead a security cell that destabilizes security in Benghazi with its trained military forces armed with all kinds of weapons and owes absolute loyalty to Khalifa Haftar and his sons only. If Barghathi had contemplated such mesaure, wouldn't it have been better and more effective to send these fighters in separate groups and keep him in a safe place to lead operations? Why risk himself in a risky operation with uncertain consequences?
Likewise, midway (Sirte) through the road across the land from Tripoli to Benghazi they will pass Haftar’s forces, which control all regions of eastern Libya. How will this force cross the distance between Sirte and Benghazi, which is 570 kilometers approximately, without being stopped or even suspected until they arrive and settle in Asalmani neighborhood in the center of Benghazi?.
By excluding the narrative of Haftar's forces and the infiltration hypothesis, only the narrative of Mahdi Albargathi and his supporters remains, which is coordination at the highest levels with Haftar's forces.
This will inevitably raise the question: Why do Haftar's forces show themselves as treacherous and break their promise? Why do they give safety to Albargathi and then turn against him? Maintaining credibility and appearing to be a balanced leadership that can be trusted first and foremost rather than eliminating a weak opponent is not dangerous; what threat does Al Mahdi Albargathi pose from his place of residence in Tripoli so that Haftar's forces are forced to appear betrayed and lure him to be killed, and how can any sane person trust them afterwards?
The exclusion of all these hypotheses leaves only one hypothesis that has been circulating on the Libyan street for quite some time and is fueled by rumors from time to time, the latest of which is the Asalmani clashes.
This hypothesis says that a dispute has begun between Haftar’s sons about who will inherit from him the rule of eastern Libya and who will inherit his endeavor to rule the country (by tanks or through elections), and that this dispute may be represented in two camps; Saddam and Assidiq on one side, and Belqassim and Khaled on the other side. The hypothesis says that the most prominent results of this dispute was the emergence of the parallel government in eastern Libya, which was strongly supported by the camp (Belqassim and Khaled), while (Assidiq and Saddam) camp adhered to the Dabaiba government, with which the latter camp agreed on several issues and which gained some freedom of movement in eastern Libya after the meetings of Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dabaiba in Dubai, and was continuing to conclude more agreements and understandings with Haftar’s camp before it was cut off by a painful blow from Belqassim Haftar’s allies in the House of Representatives by granting a vote of confidence to the former Bashagha government and the current Hammad government.
The hypothesis also says that Albarghati has returned in coordination with Belqassim Haftar, who seeks with this step and similar steps to come to weaken the control of his brother Saddam and his brigade, Tariq bin Ziyad, over Benghazi, but the latter carried out a pre-emptive strike that eliminated Albargathi and eliminated any hope for his brother to conclude a reconciliation with any party that might form a threat to his absolute control over Benghazi.
Albargathi returned to Benghazi, fought a final war there and was defeated. He may have been killed, captured, or managed to escape. Perhaps he returned as an infiltrator to destabilize security, or he returned in coordination with Haftar’s forces. Perhaps Haftar’s forces foolishly turned against him to appear treacherous, or that Saddam eliminated his brother’s ally before the latter could do the same to him. All of these possibilities, hypotheses, and narratives may be true or they may be false, but what is absolutely true is that Benghazi lived for several days without communications or the Internet, without giving convincing reasons and without the return of communications, whether Saddam Haftar cut communications so that he could fight his war quietly or he benefited from this accidental interruption.
The silence of the people and their acceptance of the abandonment of their rights without denial will only lead to more repression and tyranny, especially since the disconnection of communication has occurred for the second time in less than a month. Communications were completely cut off from the afflicted Derna one day after massive demonstrations demanded the overthrow of Parliament and the parallel government and the unification of the country. The elections were held, and after cutting off communications from Derna, the security authorities carried out a massive arrest campaign that targeted activists, leaders of the movement in the city, and those who publicly criticized Haftar, his forces, and his allies in the House of Representatives.
Whatever your position on Asalmani clashes, and whether you are in favor of one of the parties or neutral, your silence about violating your right in terms of cutting off communications from you will only lead to more violations, if you cannot express your rejection, the least you can do is not express your consent, and if you cannot say the truth, do not applaud falsehood.